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Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech 
Hilary J. Allen1 
Faced with new technologies that confound existing financial regulatory 
structures, regulators around the world have been experimenting with new 
approaches to regulating fintech.  The most prominent of these experiments 
have been innovator-focused programs that provide guidance (and in the case 
of regulatory sandboxes, regulatory relief) to private sector firms, in order to 
help them navigate a confusing thicket of financial regulation that might 
otherwise impede their innovation.  These innovator-focused programs can 
improve efficiency and competition in the provision of financial services, but 
can – at best – only make incidental contributions to the financial regulatory 
goals of consumer and investor protection, and the promotion of financial 
stability.  This Essay argues that when regulatory resources are scarce, the 
priority should be experimentation by the regulators in order to advance these 
core financial regulatory goals of protecting investors, consumers and the 
financial system.  This Essay therefore surveys recent technological 
experimentation by financial regulators (known as “SupTech”), and 
concludes that while the experimentation to date has been valuable and may 
improve the execution of longstanding financial regulatory functions, further 
experimentation is needed to address the new problems and risks created by 
the rise of fintech technologies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1 Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  Many thanks go 
to Tom Baker and other participants in the Journal of Law & Innovation’s Symposium on 
“Rethinking Innovation Policy: The Role of the State” for helpful comments and 
perspectives.   
2 Hilary J. Allen 
Our current financial regulatory system is struggling to deal with the 
rise of fintech, and this Essay examines the experimental governmental 
programs that are being trialed in response.  From innovation hubs to 
regulatory sandboxes to specialty charters, recent efforts by governments and 
regulatory authorities to promote fintech innovation and competition have 
been in the spotlight.  However, the technological advances afoot in the 
financial industry also impact the core financial regulatory goals of protecting 
consumers, investors and financial stability.  This Essay argues for increased 
experimentation by financial regulators with their own technological 
solutions (a phenomenon known as “SupTech”), not only to improve their 
capacity to discharge their existing regulatory functions, but also to address 
new vulnerabilities created by the fintech business models that use 
technologies like machine learning and smart contracts to deliver financial 
services in new ways.   
All regulators, not just financial regulators, struggle when confronted 
with new innovations.2  Under-resourced regulators can find it challenging to 
keep pace with a nimbler private sector that often seeks to exploit loopholes 
in regulations drafted long before the innovation was even dreamt of.  The 
fear of unintended consequences looms large over any steps that regulators 
do take to regulate the innovation.  Regulators must also address new 
innovations in accordance with their statutory mandates, which are often 
multiple and may conflict.  This Essay uses three innovative business models 
– marketplace lending, robo-investing, and smart contract swaps – as case
studies to illustrate some of the new challenges facing four financial 
regulatory agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”). 
Each of these agencies is currently experimenting with different forms 
of regulation for fintech, but the most visible of these are designed to 
encourage innovation by the private sector.3  Private sector fintech innovation 
can further regulatory goals of promoting market efficiency and competition 
in the interests of consumers.  However, the private sector cannot be relied 
upon to protect investors or consumers from predatory practices, or to ensure 
the ongoing stability of the financial system.  This Essay argues that the 
priority should therefore be technological experimentation by the regulators 
themselves in order to further these core regulatory goals.  It therefore surveys 
the current (nascent) state of “SupTech” innovation, and explores many of the 
challenges it faces.  In many respects, these are the perennial challenges of 
limited resources, opportunities for arbitrage and fear of unintended 
consequences, that animate all debates about regulating innovation.  
2 For an excellent discussion of the challenges regulators face in regulating new 
innovations, see Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 (2011). 
3 See Section III infra. 
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Notwithstanding these challenges, however, this Essay urges as much 
SupTech experimentation as is presently possible.  The SupTech innovations 
advocated for in this article (including circuit breakers for smart contracts and 
hypothetical data sets for machine learning algorithms) are things that must 
be “plugged in” to private sector products in order to be effective.  Such 
regulatory strategies will be most effective if developed while the private 
sector technology is still in its infancy and therefore more malleable – time is 
therefore of the essence for SupTech experimentation. 
The rest of this Essay will proceed as follows.  Section II will briefly 
engage with the administrative law literature on regulating innovation in 
general, before using case studies from the financial industry to illustrate 
some of the particular problems facing the OCC, CFPB, SEC and CFTC.  
Section III surveys the most high-profile regulatory experiments conducted 
by these and other agencies in light of the rise of fintech, and makes clear that 
these high-profile programs and policies are all designed to encourage private 
sector innovation.  Section III then explores why encouraging private sector 
innovation will not address the core financial regulatory mandates of 
consumer/investor protection and financial stability; Section IV therefore 
makes the case for SupTech innovation by the regulatory agencies themselves 
to advance their core mandates.  After Section IV considers the challenges 
facing SupTech innovation, Section V concludes.      
II. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING NEW FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
Innovation is the process by which the economy is revitalized with 
new types of products and services, as well as new ways of providing existing 
products and services.4  However, while often beneficial, innovation is not 
always an improvement, and so regulators must remain alert to the new ways 
in which products and services are being provided.5  Irrespective of the type 
of innovation involved, innovation always poses some basic challenges for 
regulators.  First, because innovation often allows outcomes to be achieved in 
ways that were previously unanticipated, existing regulatory structures often 
do not contemplate that innovation – as a result, processes and outcomes that 
are desirable might be unintentionally prohibited, whereas processes and 
outcomes that are problematic might be permitted by regulatory structures 
devised in an earlier time.6  Regulators can seek to update their regulations to 
address innovation, but the pace of innovation is typically more rapid than the 
slow-moving apparatus of regulatory action.7  Furthermore, if rules are 
adopted before the innovation is properly understood, they may become 
4 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–83 
(1975). 
5 Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
J. 173, 215-22 (2013). 
6 Eric Biber et al., 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (2017). 
7 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841, 1851 (2011). 
4 Hilary J. Allen 
‘sticky’ and hard to change – even if it ultimately becomes clear that they are 
poorly suited to the evolved innovation.8  On the other hand, if regulators wait 
too long, the market for the innovation can become well established and 
regulators may then be loath to intervene for reasons of political economy.9 
 Regulators are typically under-resourced when compared with the 
technical expertise and funding of the private sector, and this disparity 
becomes starker when innovation is proceeding very quickly.10  As a result, 
regulators become increasingly reliant on the industry for information and 
expertise, which can breed regulatory capture (a condition in which regulators 
start to take on the worldview of the industry they regulate, as opposed to 
prioritizing the interests of the public they are charged to protect).11  This type 
of capture is particularly likely to arise when there is no crisis at hand to 
motivate the public to call regulators to account.12  In such circumstances, 
regulators face few negative consequences for neglecting the public interest, 
and an uphill battle in challenging the interests of the industry.   
Even when regulatory measures are taken, it is to be expected that 
market participants will adjust their behavior in light of those standards.13  If 
those adjustments involve executing an activity that would otherwise be 
regulated in a way that skirts that regulation, then they are known as 
regulatory arbitrage – a perennial thorn in the side of any regulatory regime.14  
Two well-worn categories of regulatory arbitrage are jurisdictional and 
categorical arbitrage.15  The first exploits differences in the laws of different 
jurisdictions; the latter “exploits a legal discrepancy between the treatment of 
two types of activity or products that are functionally similar.”16 
Technological innovation increases opportunities for a process-oriented 
variant of categorical arbitrage: often, innovations are designed to create 
functional equivalents to regulated products and services by achieving the 
same outcomes by way of underlying processes that were not anticipated by 
the regulatory regime. 
8 Id. at 1849-50. 
9 Allen, supra Note 5 at 223. 
10 Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New Era of Financial 
Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private Partnership Models of Financial Regulation 
21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 360-1 (2018). 
11 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 1087, 1102 (2015).  For a survey on the administrative law 
literature on informational and cultural capture, see Jonas Anderson, Court Capture 59 B.C. 
L. REV. 1543, 1560-63 (2018). 
12 Allen, supra Note 11 at 1102. 
13 Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on 
Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures 66 DUKE L. J. 567, 594 (2016). 
14 For a discussion of the term “regulatory arbitrage”, see Elizabeth Pollman, Tech, 
Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits 20. EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 567, 571 (2019). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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Financial regulators contemplating new fintech innovations suffer 
acutely from all of these difficulties.  They also have to assess new fintech 
innovations in the context of their competing legal mandates.  In their book 
Principles of Financial Regulation, Armour et al. identify the protection of 
consumers (and investors), financial stability, market efficiency, competition, 
and preventing financial crime as the primary goals of financial regulation 
around the world,17 and many financial regulators need to balance more than 
one of these mandates.  Doing so further complicates the task of regulating 
new innovations.  For example, the first financial regulatory agency to adopt 
a regulatory sandbox for fintech, the U.K.’s FCA, identified three main 
benefits that it hoped to achieve by doing so: “reduced time-to-market at 
potentially lower cost”; “better access to finance” (for innovators); and “more 
innovative products reaching the market”.18  These benefits are consistent 
with its mandate to promote competition in the financial services markets,19 
but the FCA also has a mandate to protect consumers,20 and to support the 
integrity of the UK’s financial system, including “its soundness, stability and 
resilience”.21  The case studies in this Section will demonstrate some 
situations in which fintech innovation, while improving competition and 
efficiency in the markets, may ultimately conflict with goals of 
consumer/investor protection and financial stability. 
Unlike the FCA, most US financial regulators do not have a mandate 
to promote competition, but the CFPB (which is the only federal regulator in 
the US to have adopted a regulatory sandbox thus far) and the CFTC are the 
exceptions.  The CFPB was created to ensure “that all consumers have access 
to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for 
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent and 
competitive.”22  The CFTC has a mission “to protect market users and the 
public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices related to the sale of 
commodity futures and options and to foster open, competitive, and 
financially sound commodity futures and option markets.”23  Both agencies, 
then, must seek to balance their competition mandate (which militates for 
policies that promote innovation resulting in more firms and products in the 
market) with their respective consumer or investor protection mandate.  The 
CFTC’s mission to pursue financially sound markets could also be interpreted 
as a direction to pursue financial stability; conflicts therefore abound in these 
agencies’ mandates.   
17 John Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 61-69 (2016). 
18 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, 5 (Nov. 2015), https:// 
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf  
19 Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1E. 
20 Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1C. 
21 Financial Services Act 2012 (UK), Section 1D. 
22 Dodd-Frank Section 1021(a). 
23 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, About the CFTC (available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/anr/anrabout99.htm). 
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For the US regulators who do not have statutory mandates to promote 
competition, policies to promote innovation must be tied to other parts of the 
missions of these agencies – most obviously, a market efficiency function.  
For example, the SEC has a mandate to promote efficient markets and capital 
formation24 that could be invoked as the basis for efforts to promote 
innovation.  However, the SEC also has a potentially conflicting investor 
protection mandate that could complicate its efforts to promote fintech 
innovation (and, as I have explored in previous work, the SEC arguably has a 
financial stability mandate as well).25  The OCC has no statutory mandate to 
pursue competition or innovation; instead it is charged with “assuring the 
safety and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations, fair 
access to financial services, and fair treatment of customers” by national 
banks.26  However, the OCC has committed to supporting “responsible 
innovation” by national banks, and justifies such support by recognizing that 
the banking system must innovate in order to “remain relevant and vibrant 
and to meet the evolving needs of the consumers, businesses, and 
communities it serves”.27  The OCC is well aware, however, that it must 
approach such innovation with a view to protecting consumers and 
maintaining the stability of the banking system.28  
Regulators contemplating new fintech innovations thus face many 
challenges.  The remainder of this Section aims to make this discussion less 
abstract by discussing some concrete examples of fintech innovations that 
confound existing regulatory structures.  I have chosen to discuss marketplace 
lending, robo-investment services and smart contract derivatives here, 
because they illustrate many of the regulatory quandaries raised by advances 
in big data analytics, artificial intelligence and smart contracts.  However, this 
is in no way intended to be an exhaustive list of fintech innovations.  
A. Marketplace Lending 
In the marketplace lending business model, a borrower requests a loan 
using an online platform, and loan applications are assessed using a 
combination of big data analytics and machine learning.29  Advances in data 
collection and processing technologies allow for a variety of non-traditional 
sources to be consulted, including “social media, public records (property 
24 Securities and Exchange Commission, About the SEC (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml). 
25 Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715, (2018). 
26 12 U.S.C Section 1(a). 
27 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK 
CHARTERS, 2 (Jul. 31, 2018) (available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf). 
28 Id. at 1. 
29 John L. Douglas, New Wine Into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 
20 N.C. BANK. INST. 17, 27 (2016).   
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transactions, births, deaths, marriage, divorce, criminal and civil legal 
matters, and the like), GPS and satellite tracking, and cameras.”30  Machine 
learning algorithms can be trained to process this voluminous data set 
relatively quickly, using rules learned by observing correlations between 
equivalent data points and default that exist for other customers.31  If a 
prospective borrower meets the algorithmic criteria, then the loan will be 
made – initially by a bank, but the bank is soon repaid with funds provided 
by investors, whose interest in the loan is ultimately evidenced by a note 
issued by the online platform. The platform also processes repayments and 
provide administrative services.32 
The somewhat convoluted nature of the marketplace lending business 
model ensures that many regulators have oversight over at least some part of 
the process.  The notes issued to the lenders are securities, and so that part of 
the process is regulated by the SEC.33  The CFPB oversees the compliance of 
the platforms with federal financial consumer protection laws, and accepts 
complaints from marketplace lending customers.34   The platforms must also 
comply with consumer protection regulations in each state in which they do 
business;35 this has generated interest in the OCC’s proposal to grant special 
purpose national bank charters to fintech companies that would preempt many 
of these state rules.36  Although this so-called “fintech charter” is currently 
mired in legal challenges from state authorities, there has been speculation 
that large marketplace lending platforms like Prosper and LendingTree would 
be the candidates for a fintech charter, if its legality is upheld.  Furthermore, 
while marketplace loans are typically unsecured and for small amounts,37 we 
should not be surprised if, in the future, regulated banks begin to adopt some 
of these new credit scoring innovations for mortgages and other larger loans.  
If this transpires, the OCC (which oversees national banks) will certainly have 
a significant interest in understanding how machine learning assesses 
creditworthiness. 
30 Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, 18 FINTECH LAW REPORT 1, 5 (2015).  
31 Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance 10 Harv. B. L. Rev. [101], [113] (2020). 
32 For further discussion of the marketplace lending model and applicable regulations, see 
Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the 
Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving 
Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 493 (2012).   
33 Douglas, supra Note 29 at 38. 
34 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Now Accepting Complaints on Consumer 
Loans from Online Marketplace Lender (Mar. 7, 2016) (available at 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-complaints-on-
consumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender/). 
35 Douglas, supra Note 29 at 30-32. 
36 OCC, supra Note 27. 
37 Marketplace loans are typically under $50,000 for small businesses and around $10,000 
for individual consumers.  Deloitte, MARKETPLACE LENDING 2.0: BRINGING ON 
THE NEXT STAGE IN LENDING, 7 (2017) (available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-
markeplace-lending2.pdf). 
8 Hilary J. Allen 
Machine learning is a form of artificial intelligence, and can be 
distinguished from earlier generations of algorithms on the basis of its ability 
to function without precise instructions directing it to achieve a particular 
outcome. Instead, machine learning algorithms are “programmed to draw 
their own decision-making rules from exposure to voluminous data sets.”38  
These algorithms work by detecting patterns and correlations from the data, 
but they cannot infer causation.39  As a result, the decisions made by machine 
learning algorithms can be unpredictable, and their results may seem 
inexplicable to humans.40  Because these algorithms learn probabilistically, 
machine learning responses are most likely to diverge from human responses 
when assessing low-probability events.41       
Machine learning is not central to the issuance of notes by the lending 
platforms, and so nothing in the marketplace lending business model seems 
to significantly upend the SEC’s application of the securities laws that pertain 
to the offering and issuance of notes to investors.  However, the consumer 
and prudential laws that have traditionally been applied to lending are likely 
to struggle with the machine learning aspects of this business model.  A loan 
approval process based on new data sources and machine learning is vastly 
different to the more labor-intensive way that loan applications have been 
traditionally processed in the past.  While by no means perfect, more 
traditional methods of borrower assessment have been honed and tested 
through many credit cycles, and regulators are accustomed to supervising 
these forms of assessments.42  Machine learning, however, has only been 
applied to financial services in the decade since the last financial crisis,43 
putting  “pressure on regulators to move from regulations designed to control 
human behavior to regulation that seeks to supervise automated processes.”44  
Furthermore, these machine learning algorithms rely on a wide range of 
sources of granular data that will be new for regulators charged with assessing 
the quality of a financial institution’s lending practices45 – and most of these 
new data have been generated since the recovery from the financial crisis 
38 Allen, supra Note 31 at [105-6]. 
39 Id. At [120]. 
40 Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017). 
41 Allen, supra Note 31 at [128-9]. 
42 For a discussion of the banking supervisory process, see Carnell, Macey & Miller, THE 
LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (6th Ed.), 344-9 (2017). 
43 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
IN ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDING, 1 (2016).  
44 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart 
Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 93 (2017).  
45 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech, 48 (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359399). 
 Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech 9 
began, and so provide little indication of people’s creditworthiness in a 
struggling economy.46   
Machine learning therefore has the potential to upend supervision and 
examination strategies that have been developed over time to assess 
traditional loan approval processes, which can serve as an indicia of the 
lender’s safety and soundness.47 Mispriced loans can also be problematic 
from a consumer protection perspective. While a consumer may initially be 
very interested in obtaining a low-interest rate loan, if the credit assessment 
algorithm is improperly calibrated, the consumer may ultimately find 
themselves unable to repay the loan, which could expose them to default, 
collections processes and ultimately bankruptcy.48 The stability of the 
financial system as a whole would suffer if a sufficiently large group of 
consumers received enough mispriced credit to create a bubble in a particular 
asset class, and then that bubble inevitably popped – generating negative 
impacts for the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions49 
(those same banks and financial institutions could also be harmed if they 
themselves invested heavily in the mispriced loans).  Regulators like the OCC 
will therefore have to experiment with new ways of assessing data quality (an 
issue that will be explored more fully in the next Part).  They should also 
explore the technology available to allow machine learning algorithms to 
contextualize and provide explanations of their decisions,50 and consider 
requiring regulated firms that rely on machine learning to use a form of this 
technology.  Such explanations will better enable the regulators to supervise 
a firm’s credit assessment process, and then address common errors with 
informal guidance or rules.  
Context and explanations may also prove vital to the CFPB in 
assessing whether the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974) (“ECOA”) has 
been breached.  This statute prohibits discrimination in the provision of credit 
on the basis of an applicant’s race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital 
status, age or participation in public assistance programs,51 and the 
prohibition extends to credit scoring policies that have a disparate impact on 
46 In 2016, IBM published a report that found that “90 percent of the data in the world today 
has been created in the last two years alone.” IBM Marketing Cloud, 10 Key Market Trends 
for 2017, 3 (Dec. 2016). 
47 “To evaluate a bank’s financial soundness, examiners use the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Ratings System, commonly known as the CAMELS system.” Carnell, Macy & 
Miller, supra Note 42 at 346.  As part of this assessment, “[t]hey scrutinize the bank’s 
lending and investment standards, internal controls, and risk-identification and loan-
administration practices.” Id. at 248. 
48 Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial 
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1144-5 (2012). 
49 Id. 
50 Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018). 
51 15 USC s 1691(a). 
10 Hilary J. Allen 
any one of these classes.52  The CFPB defines a disparate impact as using 
“facially neutral policies or practices that have an adverse effect or impact on 
a member of a protected class unless it meets a legitimate business need that 
cannot reasonably be achieved by means that are less disparate in their 
impact.”53  Over the decades, regulators have developed ways of assessing 
the disparate impact of facially neutral credit scoring techniques, but different 
strategies will be needed to assess whether machine learning algorithms have 
engaged (perhaps unwittingly) in discrimination by making decisions on the 
basis of proxy variables for protected classes.54  As Prince & Schwarcz 
observe, a machine learning algorithm “does not care that the link between 
the variable and the desired outcome is actually due to association with a 
protected class; it only seeks to find the link. Indeed, because a model’s goal 
is to find the best possible predictors though correlation, it will often be 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine from the model alone whether proxy 
discrimination is occurring.”55  In addition to technologies that allow machine 
learning algorithms to provide explanation and context, other technological 
solutions may also be useful to the CFPB: Prince & Schwarcz have suggested 
the possibility of exposing machine learning algorithms to additional data sets 
that will train them to control for membership of a protected class when 
making decisions.56 
B. Robo-Investment 
Robo-advisory firms seek to outcompete traditional financial advisors 
by offering investment advice that is claimed to be at least as good as (if not 
better than) what a human can provide, at a fraction of the cost.57  While robo-
advisory firms can use predictive algorithms to provide automated “customer 
profiling, asset allocation, portfolio selection, trade execution, portfolio 
rebalancing, tax-loss harvesting and portfolio analysis”,58 there is significant 
interest in developing machine learning techniques that can gather 
information about a client’s financial situation and improve portfolio 
selection.59  Because robo-advisory firms typically provide investment advice 
to their clients as well as executing transactions for them, they will usually be 
52 Carnell, Macy & Miller, supra Note 42 at 508. 
53 12 CFR Part 1002 Supp. I Sec. 1002.6(a)-2.  
54 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF 
L.REV.671, 675 (2016).   
55 Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence and Big Data, 65 (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347959).  
56 Id. at 63. 
57 Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services 
Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 719 (2018). 
58 FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, 2 (available at 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf). 
59 See, for example, Deloitte, THE NEXT FRONTIER: THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED 
FINANCIAL ADVICE IN THE UK, 22 (available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-
uk-updated-robo-advice-new-horizons-layout-mww8.pdf). 
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regulated both by the SEC and by FINRA (a self-regulatory organization that 
is overseen by the SEC and focuses on broker-dealer regulation).60 
As I have outlined in previous work, the SEC has traditionally not 
viewed itself as having a mandate to promote financial stability, and this 
stance has perhaps been most controversial in the context of its supervision 
of the asset management industry, of which robo-advisors form a part.61  The 
potential for the asset management industry to negatively impact the stability 
of the financial system will likely be exacerbated by the increasing 
prominence of the robo-advisory services that the SEC oversees.  Currently, 
the approach taken by many robo-advisory firms is to assign all of its investor 
clients to one of several buckets, with identical portfolios for everyone 
included in the same bucket, which raises the possibility that this business 
model will make investment decisions more monolithic, and thus exacerbate 
trends towards the asset bubbles and panics that undermine financial 
stability.62  New advances in machine learning may ultimately be used to 
create more personalized portfolios, moving away from the current industry 
standard of putting investors in just a few buckets,63 but if the algorithms in 
question are learning from the same data set of historical market information, 
then they are nonetheless likely to learn to react in correlated ways.64  
Furthermore, because machine learning algorithms learn probabilistically, 
there is a real risk that they will consistently underemphasize low-probability 
but potentially high-consequence risks in choosing investment of strategies.65  
If such a high-consequence tail event were to occur, the ramifications would 
be felt extremely quickly in a market characterized by automated portfolio 
rebalancing.    
Stronger tendencies towards bubble-bust dynamics in the securities 
markets could have significant ramifications for the broader economy.  I have 
therefore argued that “in order to mitigate systemic risk, financial algorithms 
capable of machine learning may … need to be exposed to hypothetical 
scenarios that emphasize worst-case scenarios, and demonstrate the 
consequences of correlated responses to such events.”66  While by no means 
a perfect solution, such hypothetical scenarios would at least force machine 
learning algorithms to anticipate the possibility of a tail event, and then they 
could perhaps be trained in war games to mitigate the systemic repercussions 
of their decisions.  The creation of hypothetical scenarios and conduct of war 
60 Allen, supra Note 31 at [112]. 
61 Allen, supra Note 25 at 726. 
62 Allen, supra Note 31 at [127]. 
63 FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING 
IN FINAN- CIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY IMPLICATIONS, 30 (2017) (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P011117.pdf).  
64 Allen, supra Note 31 at [128]. 
65 Id. At [129]. 
66 Id. at [144]. 
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games would be an expensive and laborious process, with parallels to the 
creation of the stress testing scenarios currently devised by the Federal 
Reserve.67  It is unlikely that the SEC would be eager to take the lead on such 
a process, but it could collaborate with the Federal Reserve using the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (of which the SEC and Federal Reserve 
Chairs are both members) as a forum for such cooperation.68   
The SEC’s more traditional investor protection function will also face 
challenges as robo-advisory business models become more prominent.  The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 seeks to protect investors from their 
advisers’ conflicts of interest by requiring disclosures from advisers and 
prohibiting certain types of transactions:69 while many have argued that such 
conflicts are less likely when investment decisions are being made by 
machines rather than fallible human beings, it is quite possible that machine 
learning algorithms might learn predatory behavior from data sets that 
include examples of conflicted transactions.70  As with discrimination in the 
provision of credit (discussed in the previous Part), such undesirable behavior 
may be harder to detect when it is performed by a facially neutral algorithm.  
The SEC’s preferred approach of regulating conflicts through disclosure will 
be ineffective in this context unless the algorithm is designed to provide 
explanations and context for its decisions.     
C. Swaps as Smart Contracts 
At the most basic level, a derivative is simply a contract that derives 
its value from some kind of financial variable.  A swap is a particular type of 
derivative contract that involves two counterparties swapping promises to 
exchange payments (which are calculated as a percentage of a specified 
notional amount).71  The percentage is often derived from some kind of 
economic variable, such as an interest rate.72  Perhaps the most notorious type 
of swap is the credit default swap (“CDS”), which played a pivotal role in the 
last financial crisis.  A credit default swap involves one party swapping a 
67 Id. at [144-5] 
68 The FSOC recently committed to an “activities-based approach” to protecting financial 
stability. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Proposes Changes to Nonbank Designations Guidance (Mar. 6, 2019) (available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm621).  Though some have questioned how 
genuine this push for activities-based regulation is (see, for example, Jeremy C. Kress et al., 
Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 
92. S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1505 et seq. (2019)), if the FSOC is truly committed to
activities-based regulation, creating hypothetical data sets for robo-advisory firms would 
help address the threats to financial stability posed by this activity.  
69 Cox et al., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th Ed.), 1019 et 
seq. (2020). 
70 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1277; 1290 (2017). 
71 Mark Jickling and Rena S. Miller, Derivatives Regulation in the 111th Congress, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT R4064, 27 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
72 Id. at 27 
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premium (calculated as a percentage of a notional amount) for a promise from 
the other party to make a payment if a “credit event” occurs with respect to a 
reference debt instrument (depending on the contract, credit events might 
include a ratings downgrade, a default, or a bankruptcy).73  The contract itself 
is usually based on a form contract promulgated by the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, and referred to colloquially as an “ISDA”.74 
In the lead up to the last financial crisis, AIG alone had issued $1.8 
trillion of credit default swaps that insured the holders of mortgage-backed 
securities against the occurrence of a credit event.75  AIG did not have 
sufficient funds to actually pay all of the holders of those credit default swaps 
if a credit event occurred, but it had assumed that the underlying mortgage-
backed securities would never default and that it would therefore never be 
required to make any payments.76 AIG had grossly underestimated the risks 
associated with those mortgage-backed securities, however, and ultimately 
required a bailout from the federal government once systemic problems with 
mortgage-backed securities became apparent.77  In response to the financial 
crisis, Title VII of Dodd-Frank was enacted, which was designed to manage 
the risks inherent in swap contracts by requiring most swaps to be cleared 
through a regulated central clearinghouse, and by requiring swap 
counterparties to post deposits (referred to as margin) with the clearinghouse 
to cover any losses.78  The size of the deposit required is adjusted daily 
(marked-to-market) to reflect fluctuating risks associated with the underlying 
variable for the contract.79  Title VII also requires most swap transactions to 
be reported under Dodd-Frank.80  This regulatory regime is primarily 
overseen by the CFTC, although the SEC has jurisdiction over security-based 
swaps.81 
Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010, before the current wave of fintech 
innovation.  There is now significant interest in representing swaps as smart 
contracts, though,82 so it is important to consider whether Title VII is 
equipped to deal with any new problems that smart contracts might create.  
“Smart contracts” are computer algorithms that govern the functionality of a 
contractual relationship (in this instance, a swap) and that are intended to be 
73 Id. at 31 
74 Stephen J. Lubben, CORPORATE FINANCE, 316 (2014). 
75 Rena S. Miller & Kathleen Ann Ruane, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT R41398, 5 (Nov. 6, 2012). 
76 Id. 
77 Miller & Ruane, supra Note 75 at 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 3. 
80 Id. at 14. 
81 Id. at 5. 
82 See, for example, ISDA & King & Wood Mallesons, Smart Derivatives Contracts: From 
Concept to Construction, 27 (Oct. 2018) (available at https://www.isda.org/a/cHvEE/Smart-
Derivatives-Contracts-From-Concept-to-Construction-Oct-2018.pdf). 
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self-executing and self-enforcing.83  Smart contracts are recorded and 
transferred on a “distributed ledger”, “an electronic record that is updated in 
real-time and intended to be maintained on geographically disperse servers or 
nodes.”84 If a credit default swap were memorialized as a smart contract, the 
smart contract would automatically calculate and deduct the premium from 
one counterparty, and regularly check in with designated external sources 
(known as “oracles”) to see if a credit event has occurred that would 
automatically initiate a transfer from the other counterparty.85  The CFTC 
takes the view that swaps memorialized as smart contracts should be regulated 
like any other swap.86  Such an approach certainly has benefits – a credit 
default swap memorialized as a smart contract will still pose the risks posed 
by credit default swaps memorialized in paper contracts, and so Title VII’s 
clearing and margin requirements remain appropriate.  However, there are 
additional risks raised by smart contracts that are not contemplated by Title 
VII (particularly new kinds of operational risks).87  
Furthermore, many have expressed skepticism that Title VII’s margin 
and collateral requirements are large enough to protect swap counterparties 
during a systemic event that affects more than one institution – in such 
circumstances, the solvency of the clearinghouses themselves could even be 
threatened, with major systemic implications.88  It is quite possible that 
extraordinary measures would need to be taken during a future systemic crisis 
to prevent catastrophic failures, including the suspension of contractual terms 
that relate to the posting of margin.89  Smart contracts – even when working 
as intended without any technological glitches or misinformed oracles – could 
create new problems in such a context.   
To illustrate, we can imagine how the CDS agreements that AIG 
entered into with Goldman Sachs and others in the lead up to the last financial 
crisis might have performed had they been smart contracts.  In July 2007, 
Goldman Sachs sought to enforce provisions in its ISDAs with AIG that 
authorized Goldman Sachs to determine whether and how much collateral 
AIG should post in connection with those ISDAs.90  At the time it had entered 
into these ISDAs, AIG had not developed its own models for assessing the 
83 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 313, 333  
(2017); Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 383–84 
(2018).  
84 LabCFTC, A Primer on Smart Contracts, 7 (Nov. 27, 2018) (available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
11/LabCFTC_PrimerSmartContracts112718.pdf). 
85 Id. at 15. 
86 Id. at 25. 
87 Id. at 27-29. 
88 See, for example, Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 
101 GEO. L. J. 445 (2013).  
89 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 315, 320-1 
(2013).  
90 FCIC Report at 266 
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amount of collateral requested by a counterparty – or even really recognized 
that a collateral call might be made at all.91  Because AIG failed to negotiate 
over the possibility of a collateral call, if this right had been recorded in a 
smart contract, Goldman Sachs would simply have had to type the dollar 
amount of desired margin into a computer, and the smart contract would have 
withdrawn that dollar amount from AIG’s account on the distributed ledger.  
This could have been a fatal blow for AIG, as early as the summer of 2007 – 
but smart contracts had not yet been developed, which gave AIG an 
opportunity to negotiate with Goldman Sachs over the amount of collateral to 
be provided.  This is what transpired: Goldman Sachs agreed to negotiate, and 
they ultimately agreed that AIG could post much less collateral than Goldman 
Sachs had initially demanded.92   
Of course, AIG had issued so many credit default swaps referencing 
ailing mortgage-backed securities that other counterparties were soon 
clamoring for collateral,93 and AIG reached the brink of failure in September 
2008 as a result of these margin calls.94  AIG’s insolvency was averted by the 
federal government, however, in order to prevent the domino effect of 
insolvencies that likely would have occurred if AIG had defaulted on all of 
its contracts with other financial institutions.95  The federal government 
achieved this by pledging to provide AIG with funds to cover the margin 
calls.96  If AIG’s CDSs had been automated smart contracts, however, AIG’s 
accounts might have been automatically debited for the collateral, rendering 
AIG insolvent before government funds could arrive.  Unless a smart contract 
were programed in advance to delay execution following the announcement 
of a government bailout of a counterparty (an unlikely event that would 
probably not have been contemplated at the time the smart contract was 
formed), the government’s ability to stave off a crisis by announcing relief 
would be circumscribed, making financial instability far more likely. 
Title VII does nothing to address the new fragilities that are being 
introduced into the financial system by using smart contracts to automate (and 
therefore speed up and preclude the exercise of human judgment with respect 
to) the execution of swap contracts.  The CFTC therefore needs to experiment 
with new types of regulatory measures that could pause and potentially undo 
these transactions when the circumstances warrant.  Such measures might 
include requiring that all smart contract swaps be programmed to respond to 
an oracle maintained by the CFTC that could function as a circuit-breaker, 
allowing the CFTC to pause smart contract execution in extraordinary 
circumstances.97  In order to detect the extraordinary circumstances that 
91 Id. at 266. 
92 Id. at 268 
93 Id. at 268-9. 
94 FCIC Report 
95 Miller & Ruane, supra Note 75 at 5. 
96 Id. 
97 Allen, supra Note 31 at [141]. 
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warrant the use of the circuit-breaker, the CFTC would need to invest in data 
analysis tools that would provide it with early warning signals.98  The CFTC 
could also consider requiring that all such smart contracts be hosted on a 
distributed ledger maintained by identifiable nodes with the power to undo 
erroneous transactions when necessary.99  However, no such steps have yet 
been taken.  The following two Sections will instead survey the regulatory 
experimentation that has been conducted to date by financial regulatory 
agencies with respect to fintech. 
III. EXPERIMENTS WITH REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND OTHER INNOVATOR-
FOCUSED REGULATORY APPROACHES 
A. Regulatory Models 
Technology entrepreneurs seeking to enter the market for financial 
services often find it hard to understand and comply with the regulations that 
apply to the financial industry – indeed, even established financial institutions 
can find it complicated to understand the regulations that would apply to a 
new financial product.100  Jurisdictions seeking to encourage fintech 
innovation have therefore adopted a variety of measures to help innovators 
navigate the applicable financial regulations.  The most prominent of these is 
the “regulatory sandbox” designed to allow innovators to conduct a limited 
test of fintech products and services in a lenient regulatory environment,101 
but there are many other ways in which financial regulators can and do 
support fintech innovation.  This Section will discuss a sample of the 
measures that have been adopted, with a focus on the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  This is admittedly a very limited sample – sandboxes and 
other measures to promote innovation have been prolific in many other 
jurisdictions (particularly in Asia)102  – but this Article is focused primarily 
on the United States.  The United Kingdom is discussed in this Article, 
however, because it pioneered the regulatory sandbox concept and as such 
has significant precedential value.  Also, as a common law jurisdiction with a 
vibrant financial sector, the United Kingdom shares many similarities with 
the United States – analyzing the United Kingdom’s approach therefore sheds 
light on the United States’ situation. 
98 Dirk Broeders and Jermy Prenio, Innovative Technology in Financial Supervision 
(Suptech) – The Experience of Early Users, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE INSIGHTS ON POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION NO. 9, 3 (Jul. 2018). 
99 Allen, supra Note 31 at [142]. 
100 Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 588-592 (2019). 
101 Id. at 580. 
102 For a more global discussion of these efforts, see Ross P. Buckley et al., Building 
Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 4 (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455872). 
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  The United Kingdom’s FCA was the first to implement a fintech 
regulatory sandbox in 2016: the FCA describes this sandbox as “a ‘safe space’ 
in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models, 
and delivery mechanisms while ensuring that consumers are appropriately 
protected.”103  Applicants who are selected by the FCA receive six months of 
regulatory relief, after which (if the business model is sufficiently successful) 
they are expected to transition to the fully regulated environment.104  The 
regulatory relief provided takes the form of a restricted authorization, which 
the firms can rely upon in order to test their financial products and services 
with a limited pool of customers – this alleviates the cost and delay associated 
with applying for a full authorization.105  The FCA also provides individual 
guidance to sandbox firms as to how it will interpret the application of 
existing regulatory requirements (typically developed prior to the smartphone 
era) to new technologies.106  Importantly, a restricted authorization still entails 
some regulation – sandbox firms must develop policies in conjunction with 
the FCA to ensure some protections for the participating consumers.107  
The FCA’s sandbox has a very high profile, but it is only one part of 
the FCA’s Project Innovate, which was started in 2014.108  Through this 
project, the FCA also provides advice and other support to fintech innovators 
who are not participating in any sandbox cohort.109  Buckley et al. observe 
that far more firms have benefited from this support than have benefitted from 
the FCA’s regulatory sandbox.110  Similar support programs for fintech have 
also been established in the United States, where they are arguably more 
necessary because of the limited opportunities for fintech innovators to 
participate in regulatory sandboxes.  True sandboxes, offering waivers of 
regulatory requirements as well as guidance for innovators, have only been 
adopted by the states of Arizona, Utah and Wyoming and by the federal 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,111 and each of these faces significant 
limitations that undermine its appeal to innovators seeking to trial their 
products and services.   
The appeal of the state-based sandboxes is limited by the fact that 
these sandboxes only allow innovators to test their products and services with 
103 Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., Financial Conduct Authority’s Regulatory Sandbox 
Opens to Applications (May 9, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/financial-con- duct-authority’s-regulatory-sandbox-opens-applications.  
104 Allen, supra Note 100 at 596. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 597. 
108 Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Innovation (available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/fca-innovate). 
109 Id. 
110 Buckley et al., supra Note 102 at 4. 
111 Hilary J. Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, __ VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L __ (2020) (current 
as of October 2019). 
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customers residing in the relevant state.112  There has been some discussion 
of “passporting”, which would allow innovators to access consumers in all 
states that have established reciprocal sandbox arrangements and thus make 
state-administered regulatory sandboxes more useful for innovators, but such 
an arrangement would only be valuable if a large number of states adopted 
sandboxes with similar passporting arrangements.113  Furthermore, federal 
laws will continue to apply to innovators participating in a state-administered 
sandbox.  The CFPB’s “Compliance Assistance Sandbox”, which was 
launched in September of 2019,114 is administered at the federal level and 
therefore provides access to a much larger market than state-administered 
sandboxes.  However, the CFPB only claims the legal authority to preempt 
the application of three enumerated federal consumer protection statutes115 – 
and even that authority has been questioned by state attorneys-general.116  
Given the fragmented nature of financial regulatory authority in the United 
States, no regulatory sandbox is likely to give innovators any real certainty 
that they will be exempt from regulatory enforcement unless it is coordinated 
amongst all of the federal regulators, and designed to preempt all state 
regulation.117        
In the absence of any compelling regulatory sandbox, many regulators 
in the United States have offered other types of support for fintech innovation.  
The main differentiating factor between regulatory sandboxes and these other 
forms of innovation support seems to be the “signaling” feature that 
regulatory sandboxes have, communicating that a jurisdiction is committed to 
fostering fintech innovation (although that signal may depreciate in value as 
more and more jurisdictions adopt sandboxes).118  These other forms of 
regulatory support can nonetheless be very successful in promoting 
innovation.  For example, many financial regulators have pre-existing powers 
to grant waivers and no action letters that can facilitate testing and piloting of 
innovative products and services, where appropriate, even in the absence of a 
sandbox.119  Regulators have also pursued programs that do not provide any 
regulatory relief, but provide guidance to innovators in navigating regulatory 
regimes that were often adopted long before the technologies in question were 
designed, and as such are often difficult to reconcile.  This support typically 
takes the form of providing opportunities for innovators to consult with the 
112 Id. at [__]. 
113 Wendy Kearns & Andrew J. Lorentz, Fintech Sandboxes – Update on State Approaches 
(Apr. 16, 2018) (available at https://www.dwt.com/blogs/payment-law-
advisor/2018/04/fintech-sandboxes--update-on-state-approaches). 
114 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, POLICY ON THE COMPLIANCE 
ASSISTANCE SANDBOX 84 FR 48246 
 (Sept. 10, 2019). 
115 Id. at 48249. 
116 Id.  
117 Allen, supra Note 100 at 619-20. 
118 Buckley et al., supra Note 102 at 7, 18. 
119 Id. at 25. 
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regulators – for example, the CFTC’s LabCFTC, FinCEN’s Innovation Hours 
and the P2P meetings hosted by the SEC’s FinHub are all designed to allow 
for innovators to meet and receive guidance and feedback from regulatory 
personnel at an early stage of the innovation.  As the CFTC puts it, “[s]uch 
feedback may include information that, particularly at an early stage, could 
help innovators/entities save time and money by helping them understand 
relevant regulations and the CFTC’s approach to oversight.”120   
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has taken a slightly 
different approach, offering tailored regulatory regimes coupled with ongoing 
guidance in order to encourage innovation.  It has proposed an “Innovation 
Pilot Program” that is intended to assist regulated banks experimenting with 
new technologies to navigate the regulatory requirements that apply to those 
technologies.121  It also offers a so-called “Fintech Charter” that is available 
to non-banks122 – although recipients of this charter would be subject to 
significant regulation by the OCC, it may nonetheless be appealing because 
it purports to preempt the application of state laws to the fintech firm.123  
However, because neither of these programs offers relief from federal 
regulations, they would not typically be considered sandboxes.   
Efforts to support fintech innovation at the transnational level have 
also begun.  The UK’s FCA spearheaded the creation of the Global Financial 
Innovation Network in January 2019.124  The CFPB was a founding member 
of the GFIN; the CFTC, SEC, FDIC and OCC joined in October of 2019 (the 
New York State Department of Financial Services and the Office of the 
Arizona Attorney General have also joined).  It is not yet clear precisely what 
support the GFIN will give to individual innovators, but one of the GFIN’s 
stated goals is to “provide accessible regulatory contact information for 
firms”, and the GFIN also intends “to provide firms with an environment in 
which to trial cross-border solutions.”125  While the FCA had initially 
envisaged the GFIN as offering “a full multilateral sandbox that allows 
concurrent testing and launch across multiple jurisdictions”, the level of 
120 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, LabCFTC Overview (available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm). 
121 OCC, OCC Innovation Pilot Program (Apr. 2019) (available at 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/occ-
innovation-pilot-program.pdf). 
122 OCC, supra Note 27. 
123 The OCC’s fintech charter would be a specialized national banking charter.  Id. National 
banking charters preempt the application of state law in circumstances where the state law 
would “prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” 
Barnett Bank of Marion County v Nelson 517 U.S. 25 (1996).  
124 Gina Conheady, Is Fintech Ready for a Global Regulatory Sandbox? (Nov. 27, 2018) 
(available at https://www.algoodbody.com/insights-publications/is-fintech-ready-for-a-
global-regulatory-sandbox). 
125 Terms of Reference for Membership and Governance of the Global Financial Innovation 
Network (GFIN), 1 (available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/gfin-terms-of-
reference.pdf). 
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regulatory coordination necessary for a project has been conceded as too 
ambitious for now.126  Even bilateral regulatory coordination on sandbox 
trials is likely to involve a significant commitment of regulatory resources.   
B. Limitations 
These experimental innovator-supporting programs have primarily 
been adopted to further the regulatory goals of efficiency, and to promote 
competition127  (although some of the policies implementing these programs 
also refer to promoting consumer welfare, particularly by broadening access 
to and reducing the cost of financial services).128  Efficiency and competition 
are important regulatory goals, but they must also be balanced against the 
goals of financial stability and investor/consumer protection.  Given the far-
reaching societal costs of financial crises, I and others have argued that 
financial stability should be the apex goal of financial regulation.129  The 
protection of consumers and investors (in order to ensure that they have 
sufficient confidence to participate in a financial system characterized by 
information asymmetries) is also a key purpose of financial regulatory 
regimes around the world – widespread harm to investors and consumers was 
the genesis of the SEC and CFPB respectively.130  Financial stability and 
consumer/investor protection are therefore core functions of financial 
regulators.   
This Essay therefore argues that when designing financial regulatory 
experiments, the core goals of financial stability and consumer/investor 
protection should not be neglected in favor of innovation-driven efficiency 
and competition.  In practice, however, these latter goals have been the 
preeminent drivers of regulatory experimentation to date.  This is likely part 
of a larger phenomenon: as Professor Coffee has explained, the attitudes of 
regulators and the public towards the necessity of protective financial 
regulation tend to move in a “regulatory sine curve”, waxing immediately 
following a crisis and waning as time passes and memories fade.131  It is 
therefore not particularly surprising that more than a decade after the last 
crisis, regulatory focus has shifted towards promoting innovation and 
competition, potentially at the expense of consumers, investors and the 
126 Conheady, supra Note 124. 
127 Zetzsche et al., supra Note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 69-70; Global Financial 
Innovation Network (GFIN) Consultation Document, 17 (Aug. 2018) (available at 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_global-financial-innovation-
network_consultation-document.pdf). 
128 GFIN Consultation Document, supra note 127 at 17. 
129 Allen, supra Note 11 at 1088.  See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Dynamic Precaution’ in 
Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in TEN YEARS AFTER THE 
CRASH (Sharyn O’Halloran & Thomas Groll eds., 2018). 
130 Barr et al. FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 49; 63 (2016). 
131 John C. Coffee Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1029 
(2012). 
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stability of the financial system as a whole.   The fact that it is unsurprising 
does not make it good policy, however. 
Most of the methods of innovation support discussed in the previous 
Part are very resource intensive, as a result of the one-on-one support 
provided to innovators by the regulators (it has been observed that programs 
that fail to invest significant regulatory resources are unlikely to be as 
successful in promoting innovation).132  Such support can certainly help 
innovators bring their products and services to market, but if the innovation 
process primarily benefits the innovator and does not generate broader 
benefits for society, then it is not good public policy to dedicate scarce public 
resources to facilitating the innovation process.133  Ideally, such support will 
result in innovations that are both profitable and beneficial for 
consumers/investors (particularly previously underserved markets) by 
providing financial services more cheaply and efficiently.134  However, if 
“financial inclusion” turns out to be a euphemism for unscrupulous fintech 
providers preying upon unsophisticated consumers and investors, then it will 
be particularly important for financial regulators to continue to exercise their 
more traditional consumer/investor protection functions.  Furthermore, it is 
unrealistic to expect private sector innovation to further the regulatory goal of 
financial stability, except inadvertently (private sector innovators almost 
always lack the incentives – not to mention the ability to coordinate their 
competitors – necessary to promote the stability of the financial system as a 
whole).135  Regulatory sandboxes could prove to be a particularly problematic 
form of regulatory experimentation if they dispense with regulations that are 
designed to protect consumers, investors or financial stability – in such 
circumstances, they could operate as a form of deregulation that results in real 
harm.   
Unfortunately, the limitations of innovator-supporting regulatory 
programs often receive less attention than they deserve, perhaps because of 
an unwarranted presumption that innovation is inherently good.136  That 
presumption should not be left unexamined, however.  Supporting fintech 
innovation should not result in financial regulators neglecting their core 
objectives of consumer/investor protection and financial stability.  
Experimentation with investor-supporting regulatory programs can 
incidentally benefit these regulatory goals, by allowing regulators to influence 
the development of new innovations, and to learn about nascent technologies 
(as such, these programs should be assessed by reference to the level of 
132 Buckley et al., supra Note 102 at 6. 
133 Allen, supra Note 100 at 606. 
134 FCA, REGULATORY SANDBOXES LESSONS LEARNED REPORT, 9 (Oct. 2017) 
(available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-
lessons-learned-report.pdf). 
135 Allen, supra Note 11 at 1103. 
136 For a critique of this assumption, see Allen, supra Note 100 at 605 et seq. 
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collaboration, influence and information-sharing involved).137  However, the 
regulatory experiments discussed in the previous Part were not designed for 
the primary purpose of helping financial regulators to execute their core 
regulatory goals in a system that is being rapidly change by new technologies.  
Furthermore, all of the regulatory experiments discussed in the previous Part 
require an affirmative decision by a private firm to participate.  They do not 
provide any tools for financial regulators to pursue their core mandates of 
consumer/investor protection and financial stability against firms that do not 
opt in to collaborating with the regulator.  The next Section will therefore 
explore other types of experimentation that regulators should consider 
engaging in – experimentation that uses technology in an attempt to address 
the problems for investors, consumers and financial stability raised by 
fintech’s new processes for delivering financial products and services, 
irrespective of whether a fintech firm has chosen to work with the regulator. 
IV. EXPERIMENTATION WITH SUPTECH
A. The State of Regulatory Innovation 
The previous Section demonstrated that the most high-profile 
experimentation with fintech regulatory strategies has been outward facing, 
designed to support private-sector innovators.  In the last year, however, 
regulators around the world have increased their own experimentation behind 
the scenes, exploring the use of technologies to address their own core 
mandates.138  This Essay uses the term “SupTech” to refer to innovation by 
financial regulators that is informed by technological advances in big data 
analytics, machine learning and distributed ledger technology.139  Readers 
may be more familiar with the term “RegTech”, but this Essay prefers 
“SupTech” because of the confusion inherent in the former term.  “RegTech” 
is used to describe technologies that are used by industry participants to 
facilitate their own regulatory compliance, as well as innovations that are used 
by the regulators themselves to improve their regulatory functions.140  This 
Essay focuses primarily on the latter, and so the narrower term “SupTech” 
provides more precision.141   
137 Allen, supra Note 100 at 636. 
138 “Suptech solutions have emerged only recently, with a marked take-off in 2019.”  
Simone de Castri et al., The Suptech Generations, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE INSIGHTS ON POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION NO. 99, 14 (Oct. 2019).  
139 Id. at 1; Yang & Tsang, supra Note 10 at 366. 
140 For a discussion of the different meanings of the word “RegTech”, see Luca Enriques, 
Financial Supervisors and RegTech: Four Roles and Four Challenges (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087292). 
141 Zetzsche et al., supra Note 45 at 10. 
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While few SupTech applications are operational yet,142 regulators 
around the world are becoming increasingly interested in trialing or 
developing such applications, with the Financial Stability Institute of the 
Bank for International Settlements reporting in October 2019 that 
approximately twenty financial regulatory bodies were engaging in some type 
of SupTech experimentation.143  To date, SupTech has focused primarily on 
improving the collection and analysis of voluminous amounts of data relating 
to reporting requirements, fraud detection and AML compliance.144  The 
focus on reporting requirements makes sense in light of the increased volume 
of data that must be disclosed post-Crisis145 and the private sector’s increasing 
use of RegTech solutions to automate their compliance with those 
regulations146 (as Baxter has noted, “[m]anual surveillance of automated 
activities . . . is entirely unrealistic, and the automation of many of the 
regulatory tasks traditionally performed manually seems imperative”).147  
Regulators are also realizing that SupTech has the potential to be more than a 
defensive necessity; market surveillance for fraud and money-laundering may 
increasingly allow for real-time detection and intervention,148 and the hope is 
that “risk and compliance monitoring [will turn] from a backward-looking 
into a predictive and proactive process.”149 
Looking more specifically at the US financial regulators discussed in 
this Essay, there is little information available (at least publicly) regarding 
any SupTech experimentation by the CFPB or OCC,150 while the SEC and 
CFTC have engaged in more highly publicized experimentation.  The SEC 
has focused its attentions on XBRL (machine readable data) reporting 
requirements, the MIDAS system to analyze big data generated by the equity 
markets, the ARTEMIS big data enforcement tool and the Consolidated Audit 
Trail for tracking and recording trading activity across the securities 
142 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 2. 
143 Id. at 8. 
144 Id. at 10. 
145 Broeders & Prenio, supra Note 98 at 3. 
146 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 14. 
147 Baxter, supra Note 13 at 597. 
148 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 12. 
149 Broeders & Prenio, supra Note 98 at 1. 
150 An argument could be made that the CFPB engaged in SupTech experimentation from 
its inception, as it sought to be a data-driven, technologically-savvy agency.  Kennedy et 
al., supra Note 48 at 1143.   However, under its current leadership, the CFPB’s Office of 
Innovation appears very innovator focused, with little apparent emphasis on developing 
new regulatory solutions in-house.  CFPB, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
Announces Director for the Office of Innovation (Jul. 18, 2018) (available at 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-
protection-announces-director-office-innovation/).  Similarly, materials available on the 
OCC’s Office of Innovation make no reference to SupTech or to RegTech more generally. 
See, for example, OCC, Office of Innovation (available at 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/occ-
innovation-general-brochure.PDF). 
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exchanges.151  These programs are primarily focused on improving disclosure 
and surveillance processes, and the CFTC has similarly emphasized 
disclosure and surveillance in its “CFTC 2.0” initiative, noting that:   
New technologies hold the promise to change the way the CFTC 
fulfills its mission. For example, FinTech innovation could reshape 
the way the CFTC conducts market oversight to enhance market and 
risk surveillance vital to market integrity. FinTech innovation may 
also provide new ways for the CFTC to gather and disseminate market 
data to improve transparency. Through CFTC 2.0, CFTC staff can 
explore promising ideas and have the opportunity to develop greater 
in-house capability and knowledge.152    
Experimentation with these types of SupTech are laudable.  However, 
such experimentation has thus far sought to streamline existing regulatory 
functions. This Essay (particularly Section II) has made the case that new 
regulatory functions are needed to respond to the qualitative changes that 
fintech is making to the processes by which financial services are being 
delivered.  This type of SupTech experimentation is sorely lacking.  
Furthermore, there has only been very limited exploration of using SupTech 
to improve the performance of existing prudential regulatory functions,153 
which will become crucial as private firms increasingly use machine learning 
algorithms for risk management.154 Yang has observed that “[s]ome financial 
regulators have applied Al in model validation to detect anomalous 
projections generated by its models of stress tests, while others have applied 
it to model the capital market business for bank stress testings”,155 and the 
Bank of Italy is using machine learning to “analyse real estate ads in a popular 
online portal to forecast housing prices and inflation.”156  Overall, however, 
the BIS has found that very few financial regulators are dedicating their 
SupTech resources to prudential oversight responsibilities157 – 
notwithstanding the potential for aggregating new data sources and machine 
learning analysis techniques to detect threats to individual institutions and the 
financial system as whole.158  More experimentation with SupTech is 
therefore necessary, although such experimentation raises a host of challenges 
that are discussed in the next Section. 
151 Michael S. Piwowar, Old Fields, New Corn: Innovation in Technology and Law, 
REMARKS AT THE 2018 REGTECH DATA SUMMIT (Mar. 7, 2018) (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/piwowar-old-fields-new-corn-innovation-technology-
law). 
152 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC 2.0 (available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/CFTC2_0/index.htm). 
153 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 10. 
154 Yang & Tsang, supra Note 10 at 363; 367. 
155 Id. at 367. 
156 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 14. 
157 Id. at 10. 
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B. Challenges for SupTech Innovation 
U.S. financial regulators have been comparatively slow to experiment 
with innovator-supporting regulatory approaches to fintech, so it would not 
be particularly surprising if they were not early movers in experimenting with 
SupTech either.  However, while caution is justified when considering 
regulatory sandboxes and other innovator-supporting approaches (because of 
the resource-intensive nature of such policies and uncertainties about their 
ability to further core regulatory goals),159 experimentation with SupTech 
should be pursued as a matter of priority. The application of machine learning 
and smart contracts to financial services is only just beginning, and so there 
is still significant scope for regulators to require that SupTech technologies 
be incorporated into privately-developed financial products.160  Inserting 
SupTech technologies into operational technologies will be far more difficult, 
and more likely to result in unexpected (and potentially negative) side 
effects.161  Time is therefore of the essence in SupTech experimentation – 
unfortunately, SupTech experimentation is very resource intensive, and faces 
other challenges as well.  This Part will consider these challenges. 
Many of the problems highlighted in Section II regarding the 
difficulty of regulating innovation generally pertain to the development of 
SupTech tools.  Limited resources and expertise are an unavoidable 
constraint.  Also, some form of regulatory arbitrage is inevitable, and 
regulators must be careful to balance their commitments to preserving 
financial stability and protecting consumers/investors with any mandates to 
promote competition and market efficiency (the latter of which are often 
facilitated by new innovation).  The enormity of these challenges may help 
explain regulators’ limited embrace of SupTech so far.  The BIS has made 
similar observations with regards to regulators’ hesitancy to experiment with 
SupTech, noting “(i) concerns among financial authorities about the uncertain 
value and risks of suptech [particularly operational risks]; (ii) resource 
constraints; and (iii) a limited product offering for suptech solutions from a 
small pool of specialised technology vendors. The inertia inherent in legacy 
IT systems is another factor.” 162 
The most obvious and pressing concern is a lack of resources and 
expertise.  If technology is to be harnessed to achieve the regulatory goals of 
consumer/investor protection and financial stability, regulators will either 
have to develop that technology in-house, or enlist someone to develop it for 
them.  The approach chosen will depend in large part upon the resources 
available internally – often, regulators will lack the necessary personnel and 
159 Allen, supra Note 100 at 581. 
160 Allen, supra Note 31 at [109]. 
161 Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure (manuscript on file with author). 
162 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 14.  
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expertise for in-house development.163  However, regulators can only 
outsource if there is someone they can outsource to, and there are few vendors 
specializing in SupTech tools.164  If regulators can find a suitable third party 
vendor, the efficacy of the technology they receive from that vendor will be 
necessarily constrained by their budget, and by the ability of regulators to 
monitor the vendor.165  Input into the process of technological development 
is vital to shaping it, and so ongoing dialogue between the regulator and the 
vendor is vital to ensuring that the technology will properly execute 
regulatory priorities.166  In order to be able to achieve this, regulators need 
personnel who are able to communicate with the technical specialists at the 
vendor.  As such, if regulators do not have the resources necessary to execute 
SupTech solutions in-house, they at least need to prioritize hiring or 
cultivating ‘interpreters’, who have one foot in the regulatory world and one 
foot in the technical world.  These interpreters may not be as technologically 
sophisticated as the people actually creating the SupTech solutions, but they 
should be able to communicate at a sufficient level that they can relay the 
regulator’s demands, and check at all intermediate steps that the technical 
solutions are responsive to those demands.  Unfortunately for the regulatory 
agencies, such a skill set will be very valuable, and they may have difficulty 
retaining these ‘interpreters’.167    
Retention efforts must be made, however, because interpreters will 
remain vital after the initial solution has been built. Regulators must remain 
humble about their technological solutions, and admit when they have failed 
or require substantial revision – otherwise, the product will entrench and 
institutionalize flawed regulatory approaches.168  The interpreters will be 
needed to determine if the technology is performing as needed, and the 
technology should be designed in a way that is sufficiently transparent to 
allow interpreters to either make any necessary changes themselves, or at least 
detect the parts of the system that require revision and contract technological 
experts to make the necessary changes.169  SupTech solutions are therefore 
not costless to maintain, although they may increase efficiency and thus 
conserve resources that would otherwise need to be devoted to supervision.170    
Luca Enriques has noted that where regulators have limited funds 
available to pay vendors for SupTech solutions, the same vendors may wish 
163 Enriques, supra Note 140 at 5. 
164 De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 15. 
165 Veerle Colaert, RegTech as a Response to Regulatory Expansion in the Financial Sector, 
14 (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2677116). 
166 Id. 
167 Broeders & Prenio, supra Note 98 at 18-19. 
168 Colaert, supra Note 165 at 13. 
169 “Internal transparency should further guarantee that changes can be made to complex 
systems at a later stage, even when the original developers of the system are no longer 
available for support.” Id. at 18. 
170 Id.at 7. 
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to leverage their work by providing related compliance solutions to private 
firms who can pay more – this may result in a very sophisticated form of 
regulatory arbitrage where the vendors skew the SupTech software in favor 
of their more lucrative private clients.171  One possible way to avoid such an 
outcome is for regulators to partner with quasi-public sector entities with 
significant research capacity, such as universities with strong data science or 
software engineering departments172 – this may be the most fruitful approach 
for developing the cutting edge regulatory tools advocated for in this Essay.173  
Even when arbitrage is not baked into the SupTech technology itself, other 
forms of regulatory arbitrage are also possible – through interviews with 
financial regulators around the world, the BIS found that “a few supervisory 
agencies recognize the risk that their use of suptech might lead to market 
participants adjusting their behavior in order to “game” the technology.”174   
Regulatory bodies adopting SupTech solutions must therefore remain 
alert to forms of arbitrage, and they must also devote more resources to 
managing their own internal operational risks.175  Technology-driven 
regulatory tools may become a target for cyberattacks, and the more complex 
they are, the more susceptible they are to unanticipated glitches that can 
cascade and compound as they move through the regulatory apparatus.176  
Such operational failures may not be confined within the agency – they may 
ultimately cause problems for regulated entities as well, particularly if 
RegTech and SupTech software are designed to be interoperable.177  Such a 
possibility creates reputational and legal risks for regulatory agencies that 
must also be managed.  Ultimately, some SupTech failures should be 
expected (particularly when new technologies are being layered over legacy 
technology systems); trial and error will be necessary.178  While fear of the 
fallout from the errors might understandably deter regulators from embracing 
SupTech solutions, waiting too long to address the new fintech processes 
being adopted by the private sector is ill-advised for both political economy 
and technological reasons. Regulators often find it difficult to upset market 
expectations about the regulatory treatment of an established product or 
service,179 and it is also much easier to shape a technology (for example, by 
inserting a circuit breaker into a smart contract) during its development than 
171 Enriques, supra Note 140 at 5. 
172 Yang & Tsang, supra Note 10 at 400. 
173 “Academic partnerships, meanwhile, can be fruitful for exploratory projects on the 
cutting edge of suptech research.” De Castri et al., supra Note 138 at 15. 
174 Broeders & Prenio, supra Note 98 at 2. 
175 Id. 
176 Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure (manuscript on file with author). 
177 Interoperability is an identified goal of SupTech experimentation: “The key to effective 
OversightTech, or the use of RegTech by supervisors for oversight purposes, will be for the 
software to be interoperable (that is, able to dialogue) with ComplianceTech products and 
possibly even with Operations RegTech products.” Enriques, supra Note 140 at 4. 
178 Yang & Tsang, supra Note 10 at 361. 
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it is to alter an operational technology – and the latter is much more likely to 
result in unanticipated negative consequences.180 
Even when financial regulators accept that proactively engaging in 
SupTech innovation is in their long-term best interests, it can be challenging 
to identify and prioritize opportunities for SupTech applications.  Some 
regulatory agencies are directing their researchers to develop technological 
responses to questions posed by policymakers and academics; at other 
agencies, the regulators themselves are identifying technologies that would 
assist them in discharging their functions.181  In either instance, the 
technological solutions adopted may have to straddle a number of different 
regulatory objectives.  In some situations, there may not be any cause for 
conflict – the financial industry, regulatory agencies and financial intelligence 
units like FinCEN tend to be aligned in seeking more efficient ways to 
investigate and prevent financial crime (this win-win mentality is perhaps part 
of the explanation while so much SupTech innovation has occurred in the 
field of AML/KYC technology, including biometrics and big data 
analytics).182  More efficient and targeted approaches to reporting and fraud 
detection could also be considered a win-win, but some SupTech solutions 
may have negative consequences for other financial regulatory mandates.    
For example, algorithms work more quickly with fewer lines of code, 
and so adding technological requirements like circuit breakers to smart 
contracts could make the product marginally less efficient.  It may also be 
hard to determine upfront whether a SupTech innovation will have 
unintended consequences that could ultimately undermine a regulatory goal.  
For example, if multiple machine learning algorithms are trained with the 
same regulator-developed hypothetical scenarios in order to expose them to 
the possibility of tail events, then the result may be greater correlation in the 
behavior of the algorithms – which could ultimately create financial 
instability.183  In developing such scenarios, regulators should therefore make 
try to anticipate the reflexivity of algorithmic interactions,184 but it is still 
possible that regulatory efforts could create what Whitehead has termed 
“destructive correlation.”185  The possibility of such an outcome will be 
heightened if there is international regulatory collaboration on developing 
SupTech tools – and such collaboration is to be expected, because it can help 
scale many of the other benefits of SupTech.186 
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Regulators therefore need to constantly interrogate their SupTech 
innovations in light of their broader understanding of the financial system and 
their regulatory goals.187  This can be challenging even for experienced 
regulators – it can be tempting to simply defer to a technological solution 
without interrogating its underlying process (a heuristic known as 
“automation bias”).188  Indeed, many tech tools seem designed to encourage 
automation bias, offering “intuitive, user-friendly interfaces with advanced 
graphics and interactive tools, which empower end users with non-technology 
backgrounds … to tap into the benefits of these advanced technologies.”189  
However, automation is not a neutral process, but a reflection of the policy 
views of the regulators implementing the solution, perhaps tempered by the 
beliefs and understandings of the third-party vendor actually constructing the 
solution.190  Regulators must therefore maintain some degree of skepticism 
and humility regarding their SupTech solutions.  For more junior personnel 
who join regulatory agencies in the era of SupTech, it will be even more 
important that they be trained in developing nuanced regulatory expertise and 
temper their use of SupTech with human judgment.191  Otherwise, the skillsets 
of regulatory expertise and judgment may be lost as regulators increasingly 
defer to technological solutions.192 
V. CONCLUSION 
SupTech is not a panacea, and we should remain mindful of Haldane 
and Madouros’ admonition that it can be counterproductive for regulators to 
meet industry complexity with regulatory complexity.193  However, when the 
industry is using complex technologies like smart contracts and machine 
learning, it is difficult to see how regulators can develop simple strategies for 
engaging with them – other than banning them, or requiring a preapproval 
process that would significantly slow their development.  As I have 
previously argued, a preapproval process for new financial technologies 
would have many benefits, but seems politically infeasible at present (as well 
as ripe for jurisdictional arbitrage).194  And bans, although they may be 
warranted in some circumstances, are an extreme response that could restrict 
the development of products and services that might ultimately benefit 
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individual consumers and investors.195  Financial regulators therefore need to 
experiment with technological responses to the technologies they regulate, 
and they need to do so as a matter of priority.  Experimentation will take time, 
and if regulators miss their window, the financial system will be shaped 
entirely by the experimentation of a private sector with little motivation to 
protect consumers, investors, or the stability of the financial system. 
195 Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 232, 232 (2018). 
